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IS CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IMMORAL EVEN IF
IT DETERS MURDER?
Thomas Kleven*
After years of inconclusive debate, recent studies purport
to demonstrate that capital punishment really does deter
murder,' and that multiple lives are saved for each person
. Professor of Law, Thurgood Marshall School of Law, Texas Southern
University. The author would like to thank his good friends and colleagues
John Brittain, Dannye Holley, Martin Levy, and Kenneth Williams for many
helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article. The author would also like to
thank the editors of the Santa Clara Law Review, whose many suggestions have
greatly improved the article. An earlier version of the article was presented at
the Southeast/Southwest Scholars of Color Conference held in Santa Fe, New
Mexico in April 2006.
1. See, e.g., Harold Brumm & Dale 0. Cloninger, Perceived Risk of
Punishment and the Commission of Homicides: A Covariance Structure
Analysis, 31 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 1 (1996); Dale 0. Cloninger & Roberto
Marchesini, Execution and Deterrence: A Quasi-Controlled Group Experiment,
33 APPLIED ECON. 569 (2001); Hashem Dezhbakhsh et al., Does Capital
Punishment Have a Deterrent Effect? New Evidence From Postmoratorium
Panel Data, 5 AM. J.L. & ECON. 344 (2003); Zhiqiang Liu, Capital Punishment
and the Deterrence Hypothesis: Some New Insights and Empirical Evidence, 30
E. ECON. J. 237 (2004); H. Naci Mocan & R. Kaj Gittings, Getting Off Death
Row: Commuted Sentences and the Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment, 46
J.L. & ECON. 453 (2003); Joanna M. Shepherd, Deterrence Versus Brutalization:
Capital Punishment's Differing Impacts Among States, 104 MICH. L. REV. 203
(2005) [hereinafter Shepherd, Deterrence versus Brutalization]; Joanna M.
Shepherd, Murders of Passion, Execution Delays, and the Deterrence of Capital
Punishment, 33 J. LEGAL STUD. 283 (2004) [hereinafter Shepherd, Murders of
Passion]; Paul R. Zimmerman, State Executions, Deterrence, and the Incidence
of Murder, 7 J. APPLIED ECON. 163 (2004). As always, with respect to such
complicated empirical matters, there are studies as well that purport to show no
deterrent effect. See, e.g., KEITH HARRIS & DERRAL CHEATWOOD, THE
GEOGRAPHY OF EXECUTION: THE CAPITAL PUNISHMENT QUAGMIRE IN AMERICA
(1997); Craig J. Albert, Challenging Deterrence: New Insights on Capital
Punishment Derived from Panel Data, 60 U. PITT. L. REV. 321 (1999); Lawrence
Katz et al., Prison Conditions, Capital Punishment, and Deterrence, 5 AM. L. &
ECON. REV. 318 (2003); Jon Sorensen et al., Capital Punishment and Deterrence:
Examining the Effect of Executions on Murder in Texas, 45 CRIME & DELINQ.
481 (1999).
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executed.2 The basic thrust of the findings appears to be that,
while at low levels of execution there is no deterrent effect
and even a brutalizing effect that increases murder, beyond
some threshold level of executions capital punishment is an
effective deterrent.' Moreover, the swifter the punishment is
imposed, the greater the impact in deterring all types of
murder among all ethnic groups.4
In response to these studies, Professors Sunstein and
Vermeule have argued that since capital punishment leads to
a net savings of innocent lives, it may be morally required on
consequentialist grounds.5 There is currently a heated public
debate over capital punishment.6  If these studies, and
arguments such as Sunstein and Vermeule's, are found
persuasive, they may help sway the debate and contribute to
a dramatic increase in executions.7
2. See Dezhbakhsh et al., supra note 1, at 369 (eighteen fewer murders per
execution); Shepherd, Murders of Passion, supra note 1, at 308 (three fewer
murders); Zimmerman, supra note 1, at 390 (fourteen fewer murders).
3. See Shepherd, Deterrence Versus Brutalization, supra note 1, at 233-42.
4. See Shepherd, Murders of Passion, supra note 1, at 305, 308-09, 314-15.
5. Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Is Capital Punishment Morally
Required? Acts, Omissions, and Life-Life Tradeoffs, 58 STAN. L. REV. 703 (2005).
6. On the one hand, for example, we have the Governor of Illinois imposing
a moratorium on death sentences per doubts about the fairness of the
defendants' trials. Dirk Johnson, Illinois, Citing Faulty Verdicts Bars
Executions, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2000, at Al. On the other hand, we have
Massachusetts and New York considering reinstating capital punishment, and
proposals in Congress to speed up the execution process by limiting appeals to
federal courts. Al Baker, Republicans Seek a Bipartisan Vote on a Bill to
Reinstate the State's Death Penalty, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2005, at B5; Pam
Belluck, Massachusetts Governor Urges Death Penalty, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29,
2005, at A16; Alan Elsner, Republicans Want to Speed up Death Penalty,
REUTERS NEWS SERV., July 6, 2005, available at
http://www.infoshop.orginews/article.php?story=20050706222445418.
7. In Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), the Supreme Court imposed
a moratorium on capital punishment pending what the Court perceived to be
needed procedural reform. As states began to reform their laws, the Court
sanctioned the resumption of capital punishment in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.
153 (1976) and companion cases. Between 1976 and 2003, there were 885
executions, and, as of the end of 2003, there were 3374 persons under sentence
of death. Thomas B. Bonczar & Tracy L. Snell, Capital Punishment, 2003,
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS BULLETIN (U.S. Dep't of Justice), Nov. 2004, at
5, 10, http'//www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cp03.pdf (last visited May 29, 2006).
Between 1976 and 2002, there were 544,885 homicides. JAMES ALAN Fox &
MARIANNE W. ZAWITZ, U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., HOMICIDE TRENDS IN THE UNITED
STATES, httpJ/www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/homicide/tables/totalstab.htm (last visited
May 29, 2006). After remaining fairly constant over most of that period, the
homicide rate dropped significantly in the late 1990s and early 2000s; between
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Even assuming the validity of the studies,' this article
argues that capital punishment cannot be justified in the
United States in the current historical context for moral
reasons that trump consequentialist considerations. This is
not an argument that capital punishment is absolutely
immoral, since I believe it can be justified in a sufficiently
just society. Rather, the argument is that the United States
is not that society. Since capital punishment threatens to
perpetuate existing social injustices that contribute to
murder, substantial societal reform must first be undertaken
before it could be considered justifiable. At that point it
would be an open question whether capital punishment is
needed to deter murder.
Part I details Sunstein and Vermeule's thesis and sets
forth points of agreement. In particular, I agree that
consequentialist or utilitarian considerations have a
prominent place in a just society and that any society must
make decisions that balance life against life. That is why
capital punishment cannot be ruled out as an abstract
proposition under any and all social conditions.
1999 and 2002 there were an average of 15,837 homicides per year. Id. Given
these numbers, a sharp increase in the use of capital punishment could easily
produce many thousands of executions.
8. All the studies appear to be rigorous multi-variable regression analyses.
As such, they may well influence the public debate over whether and how
extensively capital punishment should be practiced. If the studies are accurate,
an increase in executions might save even more lives. But as with all scientific
analyses of causal relations, the validity of the methodology will always be open
to question. See, e.g., Richard Berk, New Claims About Executions and General
Deterrence: Djd Vu All Over Again?, 2 J. EMPIRICAL L. STUD. 303 (2005)
(criticizing the recent studies' methodology and conclusions, in particular the
Mocan & Gittings study); John J. Donohue & Justin Wolfers, Uses and Abuses
of Empirical Evidence in the Death Penalty Debate, 58 STAN. L. REV. 791, 836
(2005) (discussing the technical difficulty of accurately assessing the deterrent
effect of capital punishment, critiquing the recent empirical studies as having
failed to do so, and concluding that "neither adoption nor abolition of the death
penalty could reliably be causally linked to homicide rates" and that "one cannot
confidently conclude that the evidence points to either deterrent or
antideterrent effects"). It seems likely that there will always be some
uncertainty as to the existence and extent of the causal connection between
capital punishment and the murder rate. There is no uncertainty, however,
about what will happen if the pro-deterrence studies contribute to the current
push in this society for more and swifter executions. If that comes about,
thousands more people are likely to be executed. It is imperative, therefore,
that these studies be subjected to extensive critical inquiry. Beyond that, even
if the studies are accurate, it is equally important to debate their policy and
moral significance.
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Part II addresses the question of blameworthiness,
focusing on juveniles and the mentally impaired. Since they
oppose the execution of innocent people even if it would deter
murder, Sunstein and Vermeule's consequentialist argument
assumes that it is only justifiable to execute those who are
morally responsible for their acts. Yet they support on
deterrence grounds the execution of juveniles and the
mentally impaired. This flies in the face of the moral
objection that, in light of their mental incapacities, juvenile
and mentally-impaired murderers are not sufficiently
culpable to warrant the ultimate penalty. Part II concludes
that this objection has merit.
Part III addresses the issue of social injustice as a cause
contributing to murder. It argues that the consequentialist
justification for capital punishment is morally permissible
only under conditions of substantial social justice, and that
these conditions do not currently exist in the United States.
This is particularly true as to the disadvantaged segments of
society, among whom both the commission of and
victimization by murder is most common.
I. THE CONSEQUENTIALIST ARGUMENT
In light of evidence purporting to show that capital
punishment deters murder, Sunstein and Vermeule argue
from a consequentialist perspective9 that society may have a
moral obligation to employ the death penalty. The argument
proceeds as follows:10
a. No valid distinction exists between government action
and inaction, such that the government's failure to act to
save lives is the moral equivalent of the affirmative taking
of life.
b. Absent countervailing considerations, of which the
action/inaction distinction does not consist, government
ought to act so as to preserve life.
c. When faced with life-life trade-offs, where lives will be
9. By consequentialism, they mean the proposition "that government
actions should be evaluated in terms of their effects on aggregate welfare."
Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 5, at 717. As such, consequentialism is a
version of utilitarianism. See sources cited infra note 11 and accompanying
text.
10. This is a distillation of the analysis of Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note
5, at 717-28.
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lost whether the government chooses to act or not to act,
the government is morally obligated to choose to maximize
life.
d. To the extent that it saves more innocent lives than those
executed for committing murder, and to the extent that
less drastic means to accomplish the same end are
unavailable, capital punishment maximizes life and should
therefore be practiced.
This section discusses areas of agreement with Sunstein
and Vermeule's argument, and subsequent sections discuss
areas of disagreement. First, I agree that there is no valid
moral distinction between government action and inaction.
Allowing someone to die when the government could take
steps to prevent it is morally comparable to the affirmative
taking of someone's life. Therefore, the argument that it is
absolutely immoral for the government to execute someone
for murder is incoherent when doing so deters murder.
Under those circumstances, it would be equally immoral not
to execute murderers so as to prevent murder. Hence, moral
considerations other than the action/inaction distinction must
be employed to resolve the question of whether to engage in
capital punishment.
The reason why government action and inaction are
morally equivalent is two-fold. First, at least when the
government is capable of acting and has knowledge of the
consequences of its choice to act or not, the choice not to act is
in itself an action. This makes the action/inaction distinction
logically and morally incoherent. Second, the very purpose of
government is to promote society's welfare. While varying
moral perspectives exist with regard to promoting welfare,
given the incoherence of the action/inaction distinction, it
seems unlikely that any of the political philosophies that
undergird this society would absolutely ban capital
punishment.
Utilitarianism certainly would not support an absolute
ban because, by definition, it requires government to
maximize society's overall well-being." This is essentially
11. See, e.g., John C. Harsanyi, Morality and the Theory of Rational
Behaviour, in UTILITARIANISM AND BEYOND 39 (Amartya Sen & Bernard
Williams, eds., 1982); Henry R. West, Mill's "Proof" of the Principle of Utility, in
THE LIMITS OF UTILITARIANISM 23 (Harlan B. Miller & William H. Williams,
eds., 1982).
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Sunstein and Vermeule's consequentialist argument; namely,
that if practicing capital punishment would 'maximize
society's aggregate welfare by deterring murder, then that is
what should be done.12 Nor would libertarianism support an
absolute ban because by definition it requires government to
protect people's right to live as they see fit, so long as they do
not interfere with others' commensurate rights.13 If executing
murderers would help promote people's right not to be
murdered, then from a libertarian perspective that is what
the government should do. 14  Neither would Rawlsian
egalitarianism support an absolute ban. Rawls' first principle
of justice requires that "each person is to have an equal right
to the most extensive basic liberty compatible with a similar
liberty for others."'5 One of these basic liberties would have
to be the right not to be deprived of life without just cause.
12. Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 5, at 705 ("We suggest . . . that on
certain empirical assumptions, capital punishment may be morally required,
not for retributive reasons, but rather to prevent the taking of innocent lives").
See also id. at 717.
13. See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 26,34 (1974).
14. Some libertarians view the right to life as inalienable, and argue that
capital punishment violates the murderer's right to life despite the murderer's
having violated the victim's right. See, e.g., George H. Smith, A Killer's Right to
Life, 10 LIBERTY 46 (1996). Others view murderers as having forfeited the right
to assert their own right to life and support capital punishment as justifiable
retribution for violating the victim's right to life or per society's interest in
promoting the libertarian principle of non-aggression against others. See, e.g.,
J. Charles King, A Rationale for Punishment, 4 J. LIBERTARIAN STUD. 151
(1980); N. Stephan Kinsella, A Libertarian Theory of Punishment and Rights, 30
LOy. L.A. L. REV. 609 (1997). Libertarians tend to favor retributive and
restitutive theories of punishment, and to oppose punishment for the sake of
deterring others. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Getting Even: Restitution,
Preventive Detention, and the Tort/Crime Distinction, 76 B.U. L. REV. 157, 166
(1996) ("Criminal law only incidentally concerns the use of punishment to deter
others from committing crimes in the future."). The objection to deterrence as a
justification flows from libertarianism's commitment to the principle that no one
may be compelled to serve the interests of others against their will. See
NOZICK, supra note 13, at ix, 33-34. But where there are harms (like murder)
for which restitution is impossible and no compensation is adequate, society as
a whole has a legitimate interest in preventing those harms. Therefore,
deterrence seems consistent with libertarian principles so long as sanctions are
imposed on those who deserve to be punished and not on innocent people. See,
e.g., King, supra, at 158 ("[Elveryone . . . has reason to wish to see a practice
followed that will raise the cost of violating the principles of right and thereby
discourage people from doing so .... A chief point of the whole practice is to
deter, but the practice does not thereby allow punishing those who have
committed no offense.").
15. JOHN RAwLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 60 (1971).
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Rawlsian egalitarianism should therefore allow capital
punishment in order to deter violations of that right, at least
in a sufficiently just society.16
This does not mean that utilitarianism, libertarianism
and egalitarianism would require capital punishment, but
only that they would not absolutely ban it. In some
instances, all three approaches would counsel against capital
punishment and require that it not be employed. For
example, suppose that practicing capital punishment would
produce more rather than less murders. Practicing it would
then violate utilitarianism by detracting from society's well-
being, violate libertarianism by contributing to the violation
of people's libertarian rights, and violate egalitarianism by
undermining the right not to be deprived of life without just
cause.
The belief that moral philosophy neither absolutely bans
nor absolutely requires capital punishment underlies
Sunstein and Vermeule's conclusion that an empirical
analysis of the actual impact of capital punishment is
necessary to the moral decision of whether it is justifiable to
practice it. 7 I agree that capital punishment can at times be
justified on moral grounds. However, for reasons discussed
16. Rawls does not develop a full theory of punishment and does not directly
discuss capital punishment. He does say that "the purpose of the criminal law
is to uphold basic natural duties, those which forbid us to injure other persons
in their life and limb, or to deprive them of their liberty and property, and
punishments are to serve this end." RAWLS, supra note 15, at 314. He also says
that "[hiaving agreed to these principles [of justice] in view of the reasons
already surveyed, it is rational to authorize the measures needed to maintain
just institutions, assuming that the constraints of equal liberty and the rule of
law are duly recognized." Id. at 576. This suggests that it might well be
justifiable in a generally just society to execute those who intentionally and
unjustifiably deprive others of their lives and who are mentally competent
enough to be deemed blameworthy for their acts, but only if it can be shown
that capital punishment deters murder more so than less drastic measures.
Otherwise it would not be "needed to maintain just institutions." Id. In other
contexts, however, capital punishment seems more problematic. For example, it
would seem unjustifiable to execute thieves, even if execution were the most
effective deterrent, because the punishment imposed on the thief is
disproportionate to the injustice that thievery entails. And it would seem
unjustifiable to execute those subjected to social injustices that causally
contribute to the murders they commit, because capital punishment would then
be helping to maintain unjust institutions.
17. Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 5, at 745 ("Where capital punishment
does not powerfully deter, the empirical predicate for that obligation
disappears.").
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below, I disagree with Sunstein and Vermeule that capital
punishment can be justified in this society at this point in
time.
A second area of agreement is that, in general, society
ought to act so as to preserve life. In so doing, government
will often have to make life-against-life trade-offs,"8 and in
making such decisions the goal should be to maximize life.
This follows from all the philosophies discussed above.19
However, countervailing moral considerations may at times
compete with the consequentialist argument for capital
punishment. This article argues that Sunstein and Vermeule
do not adequately discuss such considerations. In particular,
they fail to discuss the related issues of murderers'
blameworthiness for their acts and the impact of social
injustices in contributing to murder. Parts II and III address
these considerations.
II. THE QUESTION OF BLAMEWORTHINESS-EXECUTING
JUVENILES AND THE MENTALLY IMPAIRED
A. Sunstein and Vermeule on Blameworthiness
Sunstein and Vermeule limit their analysis to the
consequentialist goal of preventing murder.20  This
intentionally avoids the question of whether capital
punishment is morally justifiable for retributive reasons.21
Consequently, they do not address the question of a
murderer's blameworthiness for the act of committing
murder. Blame is an essential component of a retributive
18. That life-life trade-offs unavoidably impact many if not most
government decisions--capital punishment, going to war, environmental
regulation, social welfare benefits, constructing highways, and many more-is
apparent.
19. See supra notes 11-16 and accompanying text.
20. See supra note 12.
21. For retributive arguments in favor of capital punishment, see, e.g., Paul
G. Cassell, In Defense of the Death Penalty, in DEBATING THE DEATH PENALTY
183, 197 (Hugo Adam Bedau & Paul G. Cassell, eds., 2004) ("Capital
punishment's retributive function vindicates the fundamental moral principles
that a criminal should receive his just deserts. Even if capital punishment had
no incapacitative or deterrent utility, its use would be justified on this basis
alone."); Louis P. Pojman, Why the Death Penalty Is Morally Permissible, in
DEBATING THE DEATH PENALTY, supra, at 51, 56 ("Intentionally taking the life
of an innocent human being is so evil that absent mitigating circumstances, the
perpetrator forfeits his own right to life. He or she deserves to die.").
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justification for capital punishment, because absent
blameworthiness it is hard to claim that a murderer deserves
to die. But blame is irrelevant to a purely consequentialist
rationale, whose only concern is with results, i.e., whether
capital punishment deters murder. This is problematic for
the consequentialist rationale, especially with regard to
juveniles and the mentally impaired, in light of United States
Supreme Court decisions banning their execution on moral
grounds,22 strong public sentiments opposing the execution of
such persons,23 and the large numbers likely to be executed if
the consequentialist argument prevails.24
22. Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1196 (2005) (banning the execution
of juveniles under eighteen at the time of the offense: "Whether viewed as an
attempt to express the community's moral outrage or as an attempt to right the
balance for the wrong to the victim, the case for retribution is not as strong with
a minor as with an adult. Retribution is not proportional if the law's most
severe penalty is imposed on one whose culpability or blameworthiness is
diminished, to a substantial degree, by reason of youth and immaturity.");
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316, 318 (2002) (banning the execution of the
mentally retarded as cruel and unusual punishment on the grounds that "today
our society views mentally retarded offenders as categorically less culpable than
the average criminal" and "[mientally retarded persons frequently know the
difference between right and wrong and are competent to stand trial.... Their
deficiencies do not warrant an exemption from criminal sanctions, but they do
diminish their personal culpability."); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 409-10
(1986) (banning the execution of the insane: "For today, no less than before, we
may seriously question the retributive value of executing a person who has no
comprehension of why he has been singled out and stripped of his fundamental
right to life. . . . Similarly, the natural abhorrence civilized societies feel at
killing one who has no capacity to come to grips with his own conscience or deity
is still vivid today. And the intuition that such an execution simply offends
humanity is evidently shared across this Nation. Faced with such widespread
evidence of a restriction upon sovereign power, this Court is compelled to
conclude that the Eighth Amendment prohibits a State from carrying out a
sentence of death upon a prisoner who is insane. Whether its aim be to protect
the condemned from fear and pain without comfort of understanding, or to
protect the dignity of society itself from the barbarity of exacting mindless
vengeance, the restriction finds enforcement in the Eighth Amendment.").
These points admittedly are debatable, as evidenced by the closeness of the
cases, with Roper and Ford being 5-4 decisions and Atkins 6-3. The point is that
without the debate advocating the execution of juveniles and the mentally
impaired on consequentialist grounds is incomplete.
23. In a 2003 Gallup poll, 75% of the respondents opposed the death penalty
for the mentally ill, 82% for the mentally retarded, and 69% for juveniles.
SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 2003, at 146 (2003), available at
http'//www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t251.pdf.
24. As of the end of 2003, 67 (representing 2% of the total) prisoners under a
sentence of death were under 18 years of age at the time of arrest; 341 (or 11%
of the total) were between 18 and 19; and 843 (or 27% of the total) were between
20 and 24. Bonczar & Snell, supra note 7, at 7 tbl.7. Between 1976 and 2002,
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Although they do not discuss the issue of
blameworthiness, Sunstein and Vermeule seem aware of it
when they unsuccessfully attempt to skirt the question of
whether their analysis would justify executing innocent
people if doing so would save more innocent lives through a
deterrent impact on murder. Thus they say, though without
explaining why: "[o]f course it is prima facie objectionable,
worse than outrageous, if the state proposes to kill people
whom it knows to be innocent."25 But why should that be so if
it would deter the murder of even more people? For example,
to the extent that potential murderers value their loved ones'
lives more than their own, executing murderers' loved ones
might well deter more murders than would executing the
murderers themselves. If that seems objectionable on moral
grounds despite the net saving of life, whereas executing
murderers does not, it must be because murderers are
thought blameworthy, whereas their loved ones are not.
Absent blameworthiness, knowingly executing an innocent
person to deter murder is immoral because it violates the
innocent person's fundamental right to life.26
66,764 homicide offenders (representing 11% of the total offenders) were under
the age of 18 at the time of the offense; another 218,648 homicide offenders
(representing 36% of the total) were between 18 and 24. FOX & ZAWITZ, supra
note 7. Given these numbers, widespread use of capital punishment against
juvenile and other young offenders would produce hundreds if not thousands of
executions.
25. Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 5, at 737. This is actually a
contradiction in terms. To say that knowingly executing the innocent is "worse
than outrageous" implies that it cannot be justified, but to say that it is "prima
facie objectionable" only creates a presumption that could conceivably be
overcome, for example, by a consequentialist showing that intentionally
executing the innocent would save even more innocent lives. This contradiction
demonstrates Sunstein and Vermeule's ambivalence over the issue of
blameworthiness.
26. Given the virtual impossibility of employing capital punishment without
error, it is inevitable that some innocent people will be executed. If these
executions are to be distinguished from executing other innocent people such as
murderer's loved ones, it must be because not to allow capital punishment at all
due to the inevitability of mistakes would condemn even more innocent people
to death by murders that could be deterred through the use of capital
punishment. As Sunstein and Vermeule put it: "[A] legal regime with capital
punishment predictably produces far fewer arbitrary and irreversible deaths
than a regime without capital punishment." Id. at 731. That depends on the
adequacy of the process of determining guilt and the frequency of mistakes.
Sunstein and Vermeule argue that the evidence shows there to be substantial
accuracy in inflicting capital punishment. Id. at 736 & n.93. On the other
hand, many commentators have argued that procedural safeguards in capital
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Therefore, Sunstein and Vermeule assume that
murderers are morally blameworthy. In this society, that
assumption underlies criminal law in general and death
penalty jurisprudence in particular." Many criminal law
doctrines that excuse or mitigate the sanction for actions that
would otherwise be punishable or punished more severely-
e.g., the defenses of insanity, 2 self-defense, 29 or duress 3 - -
derive from concerns over whether someone ought to be
deemed blameworthy under the circumstances.
cases are grossly inadequate. See, e.g., James S. Liebman, The Overproduction
of Death, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 2030 (2000) (discussing the political incentives of
the capital punishment system to convict and the many serious errors resulting
from the inadequacy of the process-e.g., inadequate representation of and
resources available to capital defendants, prosecutorial misconduct such as
suppressing evidence favorable to defendants, and over-reliance on an overtaxed
appeals process to correct mistakes-and advocating a more conscientious effort
to assure fair trials in capital cases); Penny J. White, Errors and Ethics:
Dilemmas in Death, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1265 (2001) (discussing evidence of
frequent errors in capital cases and recommending solutions). In light of the
racial and class bias that infects the capital punishment system and the society
at large, see infra Part III.A & B, it is seriously doubtful that the system's
inadequacies can be fixed without substantial societal reform. Cf Kenneth
Williams, The Death Penalty: Can It Be Fixed?, 51 CATH. U. L. REV. 1177 (2002)
(arguing that, except for war criminals and mass murderers, the death penalty
should be abolished because of the incurable racism that infects the system). If
not, then substantially increasing capital punishment is likely to substantially
increase the incidence of innocent executions, possibly to the point of
overwhelming any deterrent impact capital punishment may have.
27. See, e.g., Donald A. Dripps, Fundamental Retribution Error: Criminal
Justice and the Social Psychology of Blame, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1383 (2003);
Sanford H. Kadish, Complicity, Cause and Blame: A Study in the Interpretation
of Doctrine, 73 CAL. L. REV. 323, 329-32 (1985); Stephen J. Morse, Brain and
Blame, 84 GEO. L.J. 527 (1996).
28. See infra note 33.
29. See, e.g., Shlomit Wallerstein, Justifying the Right to Self-Defense: A
Theory of Forced Consequences, 91 VA. L. REV. 999, 999-1000, 1027 (2005)
(rejecting traditional theories of self-defense based on a "lesser harmful results"
approach where "the aggressor alone is responsible for the situation and hence
the weight of his interests ought to be diminished," or a "forced choice" approach
where the defender's act is excused because he "lacks real choice, and so his act
is not fully voluntary" or is justified because "the aggressor, as the one who
forces the defender to choose between his own life and the life of the aggressor,
ought to be the one who pays the price"; and advocating "a theory of forced
consequences" based on "the unjust threat posed by the aggressor").
30. See, e.g., John Lawrence Hill, A Utilitarian Theory of Duress, 84 IOWA L.
REV. 275, 277-78 (1999) (rejecting the "traditional Aristotelian" view of the
defense of duress as based on the involuntary and "essentially unfree" nature of
the act, as well as "moralized" theories that justify certain voluntary acts on the
basis of "contextualized normative judgments"; and advocating a "utilitarian
model" that excuses certain coerced acts due to their "undeterrability").
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Yet, Sunstein and Vermeule seem ambivalent about
blameworthiness. With regard to juvenile and mentally-
impaired murderers, they say that "no a priori argument
either precludes or mandates extending capital punishment
to all such cases."3' If there is sufficient evidence that
executing fifteen-year-old murderers (or, we must also
assume, murderers of any age) would significantly deter
murder, then, say Sunstein and Vermeule, "[iun our view,
there is a strong argument that states would then be morally
obligated to extend capital punishment to such cases." 2 That
certainly follows from a consequentialist perspective.
What is not clear is whether Sunstein and Vermeule view
such murderers as blameworthy, in contrast to the innocent
people it would be "worse than outrageous" to execute on
consequentialist grounds. That the issue is controversial is
evidenced by debates over the extent to which insanity should
be a defense,33 as well as the Supreme Court's banning of the
execution of the insane, the mentally retarded, and juveniles
as cruel and unusual punishment-all of which derive from a
perceived, albeit debatable, lack of blameworthiness.34
Note, however, that the existence of the insanity defense
and the banning of the execution of the mentally impaired
and of juveniles might well detract from the deterrent impact
of the death penalty. If capital punishment deters murder, it
must be because potential murderers are aware of the
possibility. But if they are also aware of the possibility of
escaping execution through an insanity defense or because of
31. Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 5, at 746.
32. Id.
33. The dominant approach in this society is that a person must be
incapable of understanding the difference between right and wrong in order to
avoid punishment on grounds of insanity. Under the minority approach, the
insanity defense is also available to people who understand the difference
between right and wrong but who, as a result of mental disease or defect, lack
the capacity to conform their behavior thereto. The assumption underlying both
approaches is that absent a sufficient mental capacity, blameworthiness should
not attach. On the insanity defense generally, see for example, ABRAHAM
GOLDSTEIN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE (1967); ROBERT F. SCHOOP, AUTOMATISM,
INSANITY, AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY: A
PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY (1991); Benjamin B. Sendor, Crime as Communication:
An Interpretive Theory of the Insanity Defense and the Mental Elements of
Crime, 74 GEO. L.J. 1371 (1986); Christopher Slobogin, An End to Insanity:
Recasting the Role of Mental Disability in Criminal Cases, 86 VA. L. REV. 1199
(2000).
34. See supra note 22.
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mental incapacity or age, then some might be willing to
proceed where they would otherwise not under a strict "you
do the crime, you do the time" system."
Unless executing mentally-impaired or juvenile
murderers is morally objectionable for other reasons,
Sunstein and Vermeule's consequentialist analysis suggests
that it may be morally obligatory to execute them in order to
deter murder. However, there is little evidence to support
that position. None of the studies purporting to show the
deterrent effect of capital punishment controlled for the age
or mental state of the offender,36 and one cannot assume that
juveniles and the mentally impaired will respond to capital
punishment in the same way as "normal" adults." Therefore,
the only way to determine whether executing juveniles and
35. In banning the execution of the mentally retarded in Atkins v. Virginia,
536 U.S. 304 (2002), and of juveniles under 18 in Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct.
1183 (2005), the Supreme Court questioned whether they are susceptible to
deterrence due to their impairments and immaturity. In both instances the
Court was speculating, as Sunstein and Vermeule note with regard to Roper,
Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 5, at 705 & n.8, and it could be that executing
juveniles and the mentally retarded deters murders by other juveniles and
mentally-impaired persons. But that is not a sufficient reason for executing
them, if there are moral objections to doing so. Beating a three-year old child
might well be an effective way to control her behavior, but that does not make it
right.
36. See supra note 1.
37. Between 1976 and 1993, the homicide offending rate for those between
14 and 17 years of age almost tripled, from 11.4 to 31.3 per 100,000 population.
Between 1993 and 2002, the rate declined rapidly to 9.0. During that period,
the overall homicide rate, which between the early 1970s and mid 1990s was
roughly twice what it had been in the prior twenty years, declined for all age
groups, but by far the most for those between 14 and 17. FOx & ZAWITZ, supra
note 7. What accounts for this decline? Following the Supreme Court's
reinstatement of the death penalty in 1976 after a four year moratorium,
executions, of which there were a total of only 885 between 1977 and 2003,
began to rise in the mid-1980s -from 21 in 1984 to a peak of 98 in 1999 followed
by a drop to 65 in 2003. Bonczar & Snell, supra note 7, at 10. Conceivably, the
decline in the murder rate is attributable to the resumption of, and increase in,
executions. But the decline was greatest among those under 18, who were the
least likely to be executed. Why so? Conceivably because of the fear that the
death penalty might be practiced more frequently against them as well. But in
that case, it might not be necessary to execute them in order to deter murder, so
long as at least the possibility of execution remains open, unless the failure to
extend the death penalty to them over a period of time dissipates the fear. If so,
now that the Supreme Court has banned the execution of juveniles, one might
expect the juvenile murder rate to rise again. If it does not, then one may have
to conclude that something other than a resumption of capital punishment
produced the decline in the juvenile murder rate, thereby undermining the
deterrence hypothesis.
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the mentally impaired deters murder is to change the law and
study the effects."
Although a consequentialist approach to the problem
would seem to recommend it, Sunstein and Vermeule seem
uncomfortable with such experimentation due to concerns
over blameworthiness. Thus, one of their arguments against
executing the innocent or using torture to deter murder is as
follows:
[I]t is not clear how policymakers could have reliable
evidence about the deterrent effects of conviction of the
innocent, torture or other disturbing practices without
first experimenting on hapless victims; and the necessary
experimentation might well be impermissible on moral
grounds ex ante, even if the policies themselves would be
permissible given certain experimental findings ex post.
Capital punishment, however, is already the status quo in
most states, and policymakers already have many decades'
worth of reliable data about its deterrent effects. 39
However, not much, if any, reliable data exists with
regard to juveniles and the mentally impaired. Would
experimenting on them in order to gather the data make
them "hapless victims," especially if it should turn out that
executing them has no deterrent effect? The mere fact that
they committed murder is not sufficient to establish that they
are not victims. One must also ask whether juvenile and
mentally-impaired murderers are sufficiently blameworthy to
justify executing them. If not, then absent a deterrent effect
executing them is a type of victimization.
In objecting to the execution of innocent people and
torture, Sunstein and Vermeule show that they are not pure
38. This is certainly true with regard to juveniles. Only twenty-two
juveniles under eighteen, thirteen of whom were in Texas, were executed
between 1976 and the Supreme Court's banning of their execution in 2005. See
Death Penalty Information Center,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.orgarticle.php?scid=27&did=203 (last visited June
11, 2006). That seems to be an insufficient sample to study the deterrent
impact of executing them. It is not clear what data is available with regard to
the mentally impaired who were executed prior to the bans on executing the
insane in 1986 and the mentally retarded in 2002. In any event, accurately
evaluating the deterrent impact of executing the mentally impaired on other
mentally impaired people would seem quite hard to do since the size of the
target group (other mentally impaired people) on which the extent of the
deterrence depends is highly uncertain.
39. Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 5, at 737.
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consequentialists. As a result, they cannot complete their
case for society's moral obligation to practice capital
punishment without more fully addressing non-consequential
objections to capital punishment. If it is immoral to execute
blameless people to deter murder, and if at least some
murderers are not morally blameworthy or have diminished
blameworthiness, then how could society be morally obligated
to execute them?
B. Why Is Blameworthiness Relevant?
Many things society does in the name of the general
welfare result unavoidably in premature death to some
innocent and blameless people. Indeed, it is hard to imagine
a society being able to function otherwise. At times, whatever
move is made puts lives at risk. In such situations, the
argument that society should act to maximize life, unless
there is good reason not to, seems strong.
Why, then, is blameworthiness relevant to capital
punishment, if in fact it deters murder? If there are
situations when morality permits, and perhaps requires, the
sacrifice of innocent lives for the benefit of the whole, why is
capital punishment different if executing innocent people
would on balance save lives? If it is permissible at times to
withhold treatment from a terminally ill person and even to
practice euthanasia,40 or in a hostage-taking situation to kill
some innocents in order to save more,4 ' then why is it not
permissible to execute the mentally impaired or juveniles if
that would contribute to deterring murder?
There is no logically correct way to resolve these
questions, and, ultimately, a value judgment is required in
terms of what are deemed relevant moral considerations. The
terminal illness analogy might be distinguished from
executing the mentally impaired or juveniles on the ground
that the terminally ill person has little time to live and is
suffering great pain. Allowing such a person to die or ending
her life might be thought more humane than keeping her
40. See, e.g., EUTHANASIA EXAMINED (John Keown, ed., 1995) (containing
essays from a variety of perspectives on various types of euthanasia, from the
withholding of life-saving treatment to active mercy killing of the terminally ill,
with or without the request of the party).
41. See infra note 43.
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alive. 42 The hostage-taking situation might be distinguished
on the ground that there is no viable alternative. 3 With
regard to capital punishment, however, there are other
potentially effective ways of deterring murder that should be
exhausted before resorting to the execution of those whom
society deems less blameworthy."
But suppose that executing mentally-impaired or juvenile
murderers would deter murder by the mentally impaired and
juveniles far more effectively than other measures. On pure
consequentialist grounds, executing them would then be
permissible or, per Sunstein and Vermeule, even obligatory. 5
If that seems objectionable, it must be-and this is the crux of
the moral debate-that for some reason it would be inhumane
to execute them, even for the overall benefit of society. For
example, society might believe that juveniles and the
mentally impaired are not sufficiently blameworthy for the
murders they commit to justify executing them.
This is an example of a familiar objection to
utilitarianism as a philosophy; namely, that it allows
individuals to be used for society's benefit in ways that violate
human dignity.46 For example, if human dignity entails the
42. See, e.g., John Harris, Euthanasia and the Value of Life, in EUTHANASIA
EXAMINED, supra note 40, at 6; Bryan Jennett, Letting Vegetative Patients Die,
in EUTHANASIA EXAMINED, supra note 40, at 169.
43. For example, although it may not have been a classic hostage situation,
the principle criticism of the government's assault on the Branch Davidians at
Waco, in which numerous people including children were killed, has been that
there was still time to negotiate a solution. See, e.g., FROM THE ASHES: MAKING
SENSE OF WACO (James R. Lewis, ed., 1994); DAVID B. KOPEL & PAUL H.
BLACKMAN, No MORE WACOS: WHATS WRONG WITH FEDERAL LAW
ENFORCEMENT AND HOW TO FIX IT (1997); DICK J. REAVIS, THE ASHES OF
WACO: AN INVESTIGATION (1995).
44. In particular, as this article argues, society should be more responsive to
the needs of juveniles and the mentally-impaired, see infra Part II.C, and
should implement reforms to address the social injustices that contribute to
murder, see infra Part III.
45. Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 5, at 746.
46. See, e.g., Dan W. Brock, Utilitarianism and Aiding Others, in THE
LIMITS OF UTILITARIANISM, supra note 11, at 225, 239 (arguing that
utilitarianism would justify forced organ donation at the cost of the donor's life
in order to save two other persons' lives, and that the example shows
utilitarianism's insufficient sensitivity to the rights of individuals and its
preparedness to use people "in whatever way will maximize overall utility").
Compare Harsanyi, supra note 11, at 59-60 (rejecting the moral monstrosity
claim by excluding anti-social preferences and employing a rule-utilitarian
approach that recognizes "the importance of social institutions which establish a
network of moral rights and of moral obligations . . . that . . . must not be
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right to be free, and if people operating behind a veil of
ignorance would not under any conditions agree to subject
themselves to slavery, then to an adherent of a Rawlsian
theory of justice, slavery is morally wrong even if it does
benefit society as a whole.47 In short, in the interest of
protecting individual rights, justice may require that society
forego that which benefits it as a whole. Before proceeding to
execute the mentally impaired or juveniles, or anyone for that
matter, fairness requires a fair assessment of such moral
considerations.
C. Determining Blameworthiness
Blameworthiness is central to the jurisprudence of
criminal law.48  The determination of blameworthiness
depends on moral considerations that may trump a
consequentialist calculation of society's overall welfare.
Relevant considerations include the state of mind of mentally-
impaired and juvenile murderers, as well as society's
contribution to those murders.
A principal argument against executing the mentally
impaired and juveniles is that they lack the mental capacity
to be deemed deserving of punishment or, at least,
execution.49  The concern over mental capacity ultimately
derives from the belief that human beings have free will, i.e.,
the capacity to make reasoned and rational choices,50 and
from the moral sentiment that executing people when that
capacity is lacking or highly impaired would violate human
dignity in much the same way as executing the innocent.,'
infringed upon on grounds of immediate social utility"). Harsanyi's move is
tantamount to incorporating into the utilitarian decision-making process moral
constraints that trump what a social utility analysis would otherwise require,
and is akin to Sunstein and Vermeule's reluctance to support executing the
innocent in order to save yet more innocent lives.
47. RAWLS, supra note 15, at 158-59, 248.
48. See supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text.
49. With regard to juveniles, see Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005),
discussed supra note 22. With regard to mental capacity, see supra note 33.
50. See, e.g., Kadish, supra note 27, at 329-32 (describing free will and the
capacity to choose as central to criminal responsibility); Morse, supra note 27, at
530 ("Blaming and punishing an irrational agent for violating a rule she was
incapable of following is unfair and an ineffective mechanism of social control.").
51. This sentiment is reflected in U.S. Supreme Court decisions banning the
execution of the insane, the mentally retarded, and juveniles under 18. See
supra note 22.
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Whether humans actually have the capacity to make
free-willed choices, or whether their choices are determined
responses to biological and environmental stimuli, is a long-
standing debate that is probably unresolvable as a scientific
matter.52  For example, the fact that two people respond
differently in similar situations, or that a particular
individual responds differently to similar situations over
time, could be seen as evidence either of free-willed choice or
of nuances in the stimuli that produce determined responses.
Consequently, society's only option is to address the matter
through the moral philosophies it adopts.
To illustrate, consider the case of a starving person who
steals food to eat. From a consequentialist perspective,
whether the thief has free will or not is irrelevant, since
punishing the thief may deter thievery in either case. It
matters not whether people freely choose or are conditioned
to desist from crime in order to avoid punishment. The only
question is whether society as a whole is better off in
punishing that type of theft. From a retributive perspective,
on the other hand, if the starving thief is deemed to lack or
have diminished free will due to a biological instinct to
survive, punishment might be thought undeserved or at least
appropriately mitigated. Or if the thief is deemed to have
free will, then the retributive decision of whether and how to
punish him requires a moral judgment balancing his interest
in remaining alive against other people's property interests. 3
52. See, e.g., MICHAEL MOORE, PLACING BLAME: A GENERAL THEORY OF THE
CRIMINAL LAW (1997) (discussing the capacity or lack thereof to reason
rationally in particular contexts as a way to reconcile the free-will/determinism
conundrum); DANIEL N. ROBINSON, PRAISE AND BLAME 47 (2000) (noting the
centrality of the free will versus determinism conundrum to the issue of
blameworthiness, and attempting to transcend the dilemma through a form of
"moral realism" that asserts the existence of objective moral truths that are
knowable through intuition and reason and that warrant praise or blame on the
basis of "introspectively known powers of action and restraint . . . subject to
projection onto creatures of the same or similar type"); EUGENE
SCHLOSSBERGER, MORAL RESPONSIBILITY AND PERSONS 6 (1992) ("[W]e are
morally evaluable for those properties we instantiate that show something
about us as moral agents, that reveal, reflect, or express our attitudes, beliefs,
values, and so on. A person is blameworthy insofar as the moral stance
reflected in those moral beliefs and values is incorrect .... Autonomy, freedom,
and the ability to do otherwise are not prerequisites for moral responsibility.").
53. Compare Jeremy Waldron, Why Indigence Is Not a Justification, in
FROM SOCIAL JUSTICE TO CRIMINAL JUSTICE: POVERTY AND THE
ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL LAW 98, 99 (William C. Heffernan & John
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So would it be inhumane to execute the mentally
impaired and juveniles, or are they sufficiently blameworthy
for the murders they commit to warrant executing them? If
executing them seems objectionable, it is not because they
totally lack free will or are unresponsive to conditioning.
Except in the case of severely delusional people or infants,
that is probably not the case.
In the final analysis, society's moral judgment about
when people lack the mental capacity to be held criminally
responsible for their acts or deserving of execution entails
unavoidable line drawing. Mental competency is a question
of degree. There is no clear-cut line between mental
competence and incompetence, and there is ample room for
disagreement among people's moral sensibilities about the
matter-as reflected in debates over what legal standard of
insanity ought to be applied and what the age limit ought to
be for executing someone.54
Scientific analysis may help decide issues of mental
competence by shedding light on how people's mental
processes actually function. But, as in all areas where science
and law intersect, the meaning and validity of scientific
findings will often be disputed and a value judgment will
ultimately be required.5  Judicial wrangling over the
Kleinig, eds., 2000) [hereinafter FROM SOCIAL JUSTICE TO CRIMINAL JUSTICE]
(opining, while noting the philosophical argument for indigence as a
justification for criminal acts, that such a defense is unlikely to be recognized
since that "would call into question the legitimacy of the general rules of
property in a society").
54. See supra note 33 regarding the legal standard of insanity. See also the
debate between the majority and dissent opinions in Roper v. Simmons, 125 S.
Ct. 1183 (2005), regarding the appropriate age limit for execution.
55. See, e.g., Maureen L. Condic & Samuel B. Condic, The Appropriate
Limits of Science in the Formation of Public Policy, 17 NOTRE DAME J. LAW
ETHICS & PUB. POL. 157, 161-62 (2003) ("When it comes to morals, the key
insight to remember is that scientific research is about the possible, not about
the ethical or the good. As such, scientific evidence can inform society whether
something can, at this point in time, be done and scientific judgment can predict
whether it is probable something will be done in the future, but science is
inherently silent on the topic of whether it should be done .... In matters both
practical and moral, it is nearly impossible to navigate the arcane world of the
newly possible without some input from scientists themselves. Rationally
considering the direction public policy will take to best serve the interests of a
free and democratic society requires an assessment of what is, in fact, possible
now, what will be (to the best of our knowledge) likely in the future and what
risks are associated with this possibility. Such an assessment can only be made
by relying on the testimony of scientific experts.").
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constitutionality of the death penalty may also help by
contributing to society's understanding of the moral issues,
although in the long run the political process is likely to
control the outcome. Consequently, the moral legitimacy of
society's decision of whether to practice capital punishment
depends on the justness of the decision-making process. If
that process is unfairly biased in one way or another, then the
decisions emanating from it are morally illegitimate.
Unfair biases might consist of procedural defects, such as
a political process structured in favor of or against a
particular group, social and economic inequalities that
impede people's opportunity to participate equitably in
decision-making, or social injustices that are themselves to
blame for causing crime. Without question, this society has
historically been biased against the mentally impaired,57 and
whether it is adequately and fairly responding to their needs
for appropriate treatment today seems highly doubtful.5"
Juveniles below a certain age are excluded from the political
process, and the assumption that parents and other adults
will adequately account for their interests may not always be
warranted. That tens of thousands of school age children
have committed murder in the past thirty years suggests that
society has grossly failed to rear its children properly.5 9
Under these conditions, society is not sufficiently just
56. See, e.g., GERALD ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING
ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991) (arguing that courts are highly limited in their
ability to bring about meaningful social change due to a lack of sufficient
independence from other branches of government on whose support they depend
to implement their rulings, and that courts are most effective when they follow
rather than lead political reform).
57. See, e.g., BRUCE A. ARRIGO, THE CONTOURS OF PSYCHIATRIC JUSTICE 97-
104, 130-35 (1996) (surveying the evolution of psychiatric institutions in the
United States from the colonial period through the twentieth century).
58. Id. at 3, 13, 103 (characterizing the history and present-day legacy of
the treatment of the mentally disabled, despite periodic reform movements, as
"the politics of abandonment" based on "an implicit and negative assumption
about individuals who act differently from what we determine to be acceptable
or normal behavior," and concluding that "the failure of existing mental health
law to adequately provide for the needs of disordered citizens is immense").
59. Almost 67,000 juveniles under 18 committed murder between 1976-
2002. FOX & ZAWITZ, supra note 7. On society's failure to respond to children's
needs, see for example, ROBERT V. HECKEL & DAVID M. SHUMAKER, CHILDREN
WHO MURDER: A PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE (2001) (identifying declining
support systems for young children per changes in family structure, lack of
community services, unresponsive schools, and juvenile justice system as
contributing factors).
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toward the mentally impaired or juveniles to justify executing
them. This is not to relieve them of responsibility for their
anti-social acts, but to limit how society may justly respond to
those acts for which it also bears responsibility. Society may,
and is indeed obligated to, limit the freedom of those whose
conduct shows they are likely to murder innocent people. But
there is something perverse about executing them for crimes
resulting from society's dereliction of its duty to them. When
society is at least partially to blame for murders committed
by juveniles and the mentally impaired, society must do what
it can to respond fairly to their needs and minimize their
anti-social behavior, attempt through rehabilitation to undo
the harm it has done to those who commit crimes as a by-
product of society's failures, and treat them humanely while
confined.
III. SOCIAL INJUSTICE AS A CAUSE OF MURDER-EXECUTING
THE DISADVANTAGED AND OPPRESSED
This section argues that Sunstein and Vermeule's failure
to address social injustice as a cause of murder, particularly
with regard to the disadvantaged and oppressed minorities,
among whom the murder rate is by far the highest, leads
them to reject what is likely to be a more effective and is in
any event a morally mandated response to murder - namely,
societal reform. This failure is fatal to their case for capital
punishment.
A. Societal Reform as an Alternative to Capital Punishment
Conspicuously absent from Sunstein and Vermeule's
argument is a contextual analysis of why the murder rate is
so high in the United States as compared with other
developed countries that do not practice capital punishment. °
The most likely explanation lies in the differing histories,
60. Between 1999-2001, the homicide rate in the United States was 3.5
times that in the European Union. See Gordon Barclay & Cynthia Tavares,
International Comparisons of Criminal Justice Statistics, 2001, at 3,
http'//www.csdp.orglresearch/hosbl203pdf (last visited June 11, 2006). During
the 1990s, it was 3 times that of Canada. Answers.com, Crime in Canada,
http://www.answers.com/topic/crime-in-canada (last visited June 11, 2006).
None of these countries practice capital punishment. Wikipedia.org, Capital
Punishment, http'//en.wikipedia.org/wiki/capital-punishment (last visited June
11, 2006).
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cultures, and circumstances of those societies. Thus, this
article argues that the high murder rate in the United States
is largely attributable to injustices in the structure and
operation of society. For example, a strong case can be made
that this society does not now conform to Rawls's second
principle of justice, the difference principle,6' in that neither
the requirement of fair equality of opportunity nor that of the
organization of society such that its social and economic
inequalities benefit the least advantaged are satisfied.62
While it may be difficult to prove conclusively a link
between social injustice and murder, the fact that the murder
rate is so much higher among the disadvantaged lends
credence to such a conclusion. If that conclusion is correct,
then it follows that but for social injustice there would be less
murder. Indeed, it seems likely that in a truly just society
murder would be very uncommon. If so, then one way to
deter murder is to reform society. Admittedly, societal reform
is a complex process that requires time to complete. But so is
gathering and analyzing the (never conclusive) data to
establish the deterrent impact of capital punishment,
designing a fair process for implementing it,64 and waiting for
the deterrent impact to take effect. All the time, energy and
money spent on that process could be devoted instead to
reforming society, thereby speeding up the impact that
61. RAWLS, supra note 15, at 83 ("Social and economic inequalities are to be
arranged so that they are both (a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged
and (b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair
equality of opportunity.").
62. See, e.g., R.G. PEFFER, MARXISM, MORALITY, AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 361-
433 (1990) (examining parallels between Marx's critique of bourgeois society
and Rawls's theory of social justice).
63. See infra note 89. For example, among those on death row at the end of
2003, almost all of whom were male, 52% had not graduated high school at the
time of their arrest, 38% had a high school degree, and only 9% had attended
college. Bonczar & Snell, supra note 7, at 6 tbl.5. As of 2000, by way of
comparison, among the country's male population 25 and older (representing
60% of those on death row at the time of their arrest), 20% had not graduated
high school, 28% had a high school degree, and 52% had attended college. U.S.
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, AMERICAN FACT FINDER: EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT,
http://factfinder.census.gov (highlight "People" and click on "Education"
hyperlink; then follow "Educational Attainment" hyperlink). Among the
country's male population 18-24 (representing 38% on death row), 29% had not
graduated high school, 30% had a high school degree, and 41% had attended
college. Id.
64. See supra note 26 (regarding the importance of and difficulties in
designing and implementing a fair process for capital punishment).
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reformation would have in reducing murder.
Now, suppose one believes that American society is
morally obligated to comply with Rawls's principles of justice,
and even that those principles are implicit in the society's
foundational moral precepts as set forth in the Declaration of
Independence and the Constitution.65 If reforming society in
accordance with those principles would prevent murder, then
to opt instead for capital punishment might in the long run
produce more innocent deaths than would reforming society.
The moral choice then, even pursuant to Sunstein and
Vermeule's consequentionalist approach, must be to opt for
societal reform.
Sunstein and Vermeule mention societal reform as an
alternative to capital punishment, but reject it as politically
impracticable:
Switching to a Swedish-style welfare state might (or might
not) reduce crime dramatically, but we will never know
because we will never try it. So too, increasing job-
training funds by several orders of magnitude might
result in many fewer murders, but such policies are
simply not in the cards. Capital punishment, by contrast,
is very much a live policy option .... 66
This acknowledges that societal reform might reduce
murder more than capital punishment. The fault in the
analysis is that it treats societal reform and capital
punishment as if they are otherwise equal policy choices, such
that the only task is to decide which is more politically viable.
But if society's injustices cause murder, and if rectifying those
65. See, e.g., CASS M. SUNSTEIN, THE SECOND BILL OF RIGHTS (2004)
(arguing that Franklin Roosevelt's so-called Second Bill of Rights, including the
right to education, a job, a decent home, and adequate health care, merits the
status of the Declaration of Independence as a statement of society's most
fundamental principles); Linda M. Keller, The American Rejection of Economic
Rights as Human Rights and the Declaration of Independence: Does the Pursuit
of Happiness Require Basic Economic Rights, 19 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 557,
560 (2003) (arguing that the government has "the duty to facilitate the pursuit
of happiness by providing minimum economic means," including basic economic
rights now widely accepted in the international community to such things as
food, shelter, education, employment and health care); Frank I. Michelman, In
Pursuit of Welfare Rights: One View of Rawls' Theory of Justice, 121 U. PA. L.
REV. 962 (1973) (exploring the possibility of deriving from Rawls's principles of
justice constitutionally required welfare rights in the form of a guaranteed
social minimum or guarantees to basic goods like education and health care).
66. Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 5, at 733.
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injustices can dramatically reduce murder, then society is
morally obligated to choose reformation. To opt for capital
punishment under those circumstances is an immoral choice
because it would leave intact the murders that result from
social injustice and that capital punishment does not deter,
and because it would lead to the execution of people who
would not have committed murder had society instead opted
to reform. Political infeasibility is not a valid excuse for
failing to do that which morality requires.
B. Societal Reform and the Black Community
The debate over capital punishment versus societal
reform is particularly poignant for African Americans.67 In
fact, the murder rate is much higher in the black than in the
white community,68 most murders are intra-racial, 69 and the
death penalty is substantially less likely to be imposed when
the victim is black.70  Consequently, the implications of
67. See, e.g., Bryan Stevenson, Close to Death: Reflections on Race and
Capital Punishment in America, in DEBATING THE DEATH PENALTY, supra note
21, at 76, 85 (arguing that "endemic racial bias issues provide a particularly
useful vehicle for demonstrating that the death penalty should be abandoned in
this country").
68. Between 1976 and 2002, the homicide victimization rate per 100,000
population among whites ranged between 3.3-6.1, whereas among African
Americans it ranged between 20.4-39.3. Fox & ZAWITZ, supra note 7, at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/homicide/tables/vracetab.htm. Between 1976 and
2002, 51% of murder victims were white and 47% were black; of the offenders,
46% were white and 52% black. Id. at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/homicide/race.htm#vrace.
69. Between 1976 and 2002, 86% of white victims were murdered by other
whites and 94% of black victims were murdered by other African Americans.
Id. at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/homicide/race.htm#vrace.
70. See, e.g., John Blume et al., Explaining Death Row's Population and
Racial Composition, 1 J. EMPIRICAL L. STUD. 165, 166-67 (2004) (finding, based
on capital convictions between 1977-1999, that African Americans are
sentenced to death at lower rates than whites, and that the death-sentence rate
is highest in white-victim/black-offender cases, next highest in white-
victim/white-offender cases, and lowest in black-victim/black-offender cases);
Randall L. Kennedy, McClesky v. Kemp: Race, Capital Punishment, and the
Supreme Court, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1388, 1395-98 (1988) (discussing studies
showing that offenders are more likely to receive the death penalty when the
victim is white than black, including the famous Baldus study used in McClesky
that found that the chance of receiving the death penalty was 4.3 times greater
when the victim was white than black). Based on Blume's data, Sunstein and
Vermeule find that the death-sentence rate is 4.2 times greater in white-on-
white than in black-on-black murders. Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 5, at
729 & n.76. Note that they also find the death-sentence rate to be by far the
highest in black-on-white murders, where the rate is 2.2 times greater than in
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Sunstein and Vermeule's argument for capital punishment is
that in order to save the lives of innocent black victims, many
more African Americans, and especially African-American
males,71 should be executed than at present.
Before doing so, morality requires addressing the
question of why the murder rate is so high among African
Americans. The inescapable explanation is that this
phenomenon is a by-product of this society's racist past and of
its failure yet to rectify the injustices done to the black
community. The result of these injustices is reflected in
virtually every aspect of American life. African Americans
are grossly over-represented on the poverty and
unemployment roles, on average have far lower family
incomes and receive a far inferior education than whites, are
still subjected to substantial overt discrimination in housing
and employment, and are grossly underrepresented in the
political process.72  An astounding one-third of African-
American males under age 30 are either incarcerated or on
probation or parole.73  Literally thousands of African-
American males, the majority of them young, are likely to be
executed with increased use of capital punishment.74
white-on-white murders, thus indicating a substantial prejudicial effect against
black offenders when the victim is white. Id.
71. The vast majority of murders are committed by males. Between 1976
and 2002, 89% of offenders were male and 11% were female. FOX & ZAWITZ,
supra note 7, at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/homicide/gender.htm#osex.
72. On these points, see Thomas Kleven, Brown's Lesson: To Integrate or
Separate Is Not the Question, but How to Achieve a Non-Racist Society, 5 MD.
L.J. OF RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 43 (2005).
73. This figure is extrapolated from the available data. In 2003, an
estimated 12% of black males in their 20s were incarcerated. Paige M. Harrison
& Jennifer C. Karberg, Prison and Jail Inmates at Midyear 2003, BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS BULLETIN (U.S. Dep't of Justice), May 2004, at 11 & tbl.13,
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/pjim03.pdf (last visited June 11, 2006).
Also in 2003, about 30% of those under correctional supervision were
incarcerated, while more than twice as many (70%) were on probation (59%) or
parole (11%). Of the probationers, 30% were black; of the parolees, 41% were
black; and more than 80% of those on probation or parole were males. Lauren
E. Glaze & Seri Palla, Probation and Parole in the United States, 2003, BUREAU
OF JUSTICE STATISTICS BULLETIN (U.S. Dep't of Justice), July 2004, at 4, 6-7
tbls.4, 7 & 8, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/ppus03.pdf. Assuming a
comparable age breakdown of those on probation or parole as those
incarcerated, then an estimate of as many as 20%-24% of black males under 30
on probation or parole in addition to the 13% incarcerated seems in the
ballpark.
74. Between 1976 and 2002, there were a total of 275,998 black male
homicide offenders. Fox & ZAwITz, supra note 7, at
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The impact on the black community of crime and of
punitive approaches to dealing with crime has been
devastating and will continue to be so with increased use of
capital punishment. Given the society's racist heritage, its
paramount moral obligation to the black community is to
rectify the on-going injustices that contribute to such high
crime and murder rates there. This is not to excuse murder.
But after creating the situation in the first place, for society
to resort to the death penalty and to execute thousands of
young, mostly male African Americans as a way to deter
murder in the black community is doubly racist and smacks
quite frankly of genocide.75
This may explain, despite the far higher incidence of
murder among African Americans, why their support for
capital punishment is far weaker than among whites.76 Even
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/homicide/tables/oarstab.htm. Between 1977 and
2003, a total of 2,723 African Americans (representing about 1% of the black
male offenders between 1976 and 2002) received death sentences, almost 99% of
whom were males and about 62% of whom were under 30. Bonczar & Snell,
supra note 7, at 6, 7, 11. If, in response to increased use of capital punishment
as a means of deterrence, the death sentence rate were to rise to, say, 5%-10% of
offenders, it is likely that thousands of black males, the majority under 30,
would be executed.
75. Given the racist history of this society and the uniqueness of the
African-American experience, it cannot be assumed that studies purporting to
show that in general capital punishment deters murder apply as well to the
black and white communities. Only one of the recent studies controlled for race,
and it did find a deterrent effect for both white and black victims. Shepherd,
Murders of Passion, supra note 1, at 305. One study hardly seems enough to
warrant executing thousands of African Americans.
76. A 2003 Gallup poll found that 67% of whites favored and 29% opposed
the death penalty for murder, whereas for African Americans, 39% favored and
54% opposed the death penalty. SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS
2003, supra note 23, at 146. In a 2001 Harris poll the figures were: 73% of
whites favored the death penalty and 22% opposed, whereas 46% of African
Americans favored and 43% opposed. Id. at 139 tbl.2.46. Public opinion
regarding capital punishment has fluctuated over the years. Annual Gallup
polls show public support versus opposition to the death penalty at 68%/25% in
1953, declining to a low of 42%/47% in 1966, rising to a high of 80%/16% in
1994, declining again to 65%/27% in 2001, and rising to 71%/26% in 2004.
Clark County (Ind.) Prosecuting Attorney, Public Opinion and the Death
Penalty, http://www.clarkprosecutor.orghtml/death/opinion.htm (last visited
June 11, 2006). However, support for capital punishment is less when the
question asked is whether death or life imprisonment is the better penalty for
murder. In 1985, 56% favored death and 34% life, rising to a high of 61%
favoring death and 29% life in 1997, and declining to 50% favoring death and
46% life in 2004. Death Penalty Information Center, Gallop Poll: Public
Divided Between Death Penalty and Life Imprisonment Without Parole,
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if capital punishment deters murder in the black community
in the short run, African Americans may perceive it as unjust
and, by distracting attention from societal racism, as
perpetuating the conditions that cause murder in the black
community. In the long run, this might result in more deaths
from murder and execution combined than if society did the
right thing now. In a society still racially divided as a result
of societal racism, and with the impact of an increased use of
the death penalty likely to be highest in the black community,
its view of capital punishment should not be lightly
overridden.
C. Can Capital Punishment Complement Societal Reform?
Sunstein and Vermeule suggest a possible response to
the social injustice argument: "[A] plausible inference is that
whatever steps states take to reduce homicide, capital
punishment will provide further deterrence."77 This implies,
even conceding that society is obligated to rectify its
injustices, that as long as it proceeds to do so it should also
practice capital punishment to deter murder further, at least
until reform reduces murder to a level that capital
punishment is no longer needed as a deterrent. However,
Sunstein and Vermeule seem to believe that this point will
never be reached: "Whatever states do, some level of homicide
is inevitable."78 So even in a fully just society, they feel that
capital punishment will be a needed and morally-obligatory
deterrent.
There are several objections to this line of argument.
First, since resources are always limited, practicing capital
punishment will divert resources that could be devoted to
societal reform. This will slow down the speed at which
societal reform could occur if society had the willpower to do
what morality requires.
Second, as a practical matter, reliance on capital
punishment may impede more aggressive reform efforts by
distracting attention from societal injustices and focusing
instead on what might seem to be a quicker fix. For example,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.orglarticle.php?scid=23&did=1029 (last visited
June 11, 2006).
77. Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 5, at 732.
78. Id.
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the current emphasis on personal responsibility as the
solution to social ills (as with welfare reform) has in fact
diverted attention from society's contribution to those ills."9
Sunstein and Vermeule acknowledge this possibility, but then
discount it:
[P]erhaps capital punishment reduces the political
incentive to adopt other strategies, and if this were so, the
argument for capital punishment would surely be
weakened. But there is little reason to believe that if
capital punishment were abolished, there would be
significantly larger efforts to reduce violent crime through
education and training programs.80
Perhaps not. But society's unwillingness to do what justice
requires cannot excuse doing instead what justice condemns.
Third, even acknowledging the likelihood of some amount
of murder in a just society, capital punishment would not
necessarily operate as a deterrent in that context. Below
some level of execution, capital punishment may cease to
work as a deterrent."' Perhaps the murders that occur in a
just society are of a type that capital punishment cannot
deter. If in a just society it turns out that capital punishment
decreases the residual murder rate, then a consequentialist
case can be made for it. Until then, society's moral obligation
is to do all it can to reform itself as quickly as possible.
D. Can Anyone Be Punished?
A possible objection to the societal reform argument is
79. Compare Dripps, supra note 27, at 390 (discussing the psychological
tendency in this society to "overassess individual responsibility and underassess
situational factors" in assessing blameworthiness); Susan L. Thomas, "Ending
Welfare as We Know It," or Farewell to the Rights of Women on Welfare? A
Constitutional and Human Rights Analysis of the Personal Responsibility Act,
78 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 179, 202 (2001) (arguing that the Act violates
women's human rights and advocating "a welfare law that enhances rather than
diminishes the citizenship of all single mothers in poverty who need
governmental assistance to survive").
80. Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 5, at 733.
81. In fact, one of the recent studies found that low levels of execution
actually have the brutalizing effect of increasing the murder rate. Shepherd,
Deterrence Versus Brutalization, supra note 1, at 233-42. The import of these
findings is that states choosing to practice capital punishment must be prepared
to execute large enough numbers of people to make deterrence work, and that
continuing to execute people after the murder rate has been lowered below a
certain level, either through the deterrent impact of capital punishment or
societal reform, would be self-defeating.
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that it extends far beyond the field of capital punishment to
many other areas of social life where it may yield absurd
results. For example, if capital punishment is immoral when
societal injustices cause murder, the same could be said of the
entire criminal justice system. It can plausibly be argued
that crime in general, or at least certain types of crime, are a
by-product of social injustice. 2  Does this mean that it is
immoral to imprison people who commit crimes that would
not occur but for social injustice?8 3
The answer is not that simple. Having wronged both
those who commit crimes and those who are its victims,
society must respond justly to both in a balanced manner.
Society is obligated to protect the innocent, and toward that
end may restrain those who for whatever reason are
unwilling to refrain from crime. Society is also obligated to
attempt to rehabilitate those whose crimes result from social
injustice so as to enable them to regain the freedom that
human dignity demands. Society may continue to confine
those who have become irretrievably incorrigible. But in light
of its contribution to the dilemma, society must accord them
humane treatment while confined. Subject to these
constraints, confinement may be used as an incidental means
of deterring others from crime, but society's principal means
of deterrence must be to begin practicing social justice."
82. See, e.g., Richard Delgado, "Rotten Social Background': Should the
Criminal Law Recognize a Defense of Severe Environmental Deprivations?, 3
LAW & INEQ. 9, 23-37 (1985) (discussing social science studies identifying as
causes of crime such factors as poverty, substandard living conditions,
malnutrition, inadequate education, mistreatment by the police, and racism).
83. See, e.g., id. (advocating such a defense); FROM SOCIAL JUSTICE TO
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 53 (essays pro and con on whether and the
extent to which poverty does and should excuse or mitigate punishment for
criminal behavior); Human Rights Coalition, HRC Mission,
http://hrcoalition.org/node/6 (last visited June 11, 2006) (advocating the
dismantling of the prison system in favor of "a system of accountability that is
truly based in the community and focuses on healing, not punishing").
84. Compare R. George Wright, The Progressive Logic of Criminal
Responsibility and the Circumstances of the Most Deprived, 43 CATH. U. L. REV.
459, 462 (1994) (arguing that, as a result of the impact of negative
environmental conditions that impair the capacities on which moral
responsibility depends, "the criminal law systematically punishes substantial
numbers of the most deprived who... cannot reasonably be said to have moral
responsibility for their charged conduct" and, while acknowledging the need to
confine those who pose a continuing danger to others, advocating the creation of
social conditions in which people have the opportunity to develop those
capacities).
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Above all, having contributed to murder through social
injustice, society must not compound the problem through
practicing capital punishment in the name of deterrence.
Sometimes, as a result of their immoral actions, people and
societies put themselves in situations where even acts of self-
preservation become immoral. For example, if one country
unjustly invades another and finds its troops surrounded by
an enemy engaged in justifiable self-defense, it is not
justifiable to kill innocent people to save the troops' lives.
Those who commit murder in response to society's having
treated them unjustly may not be entirely innocent, but for
society to execute them after helping create the situation is
perverse.
E. Intergenerational Rights and Responsibilities
Another possible objection to the societal reform
argument relates to the distinction between individuals and
society. It is easier to justify requiring someone who has
wronged another to rectify that wrong, even at the cost of
some personal suffering, than to justify making innocent
people suffer in order to correct society's past wrongs. As
between two individuals, when one of the two must suffer a
loss as a consequence of some immoral act, the argument for
imposing the loss on the culpable party is strong. But why
should society, in correcting its past wrongs, be entitled to
impose on those alive today who did not participate in
perpetrating those wrongs? To a great extent, the answer
depends on one's view of intergenerational rights and
responsibilities. This, in turn, depends on whether one has a
more individualistic or communal view of society.
From an individualistic perspective, when those alive
today benefit from the wrongs of their antecedents, requiring
them to suffer in order to rectify the present effects of those
wrongs is somewhat analogous to the two individuals
discussed in the prior paragraph. As between innocent
parties, some of whom suffer from society's past wrongs and
others of whom benefit, if one side must suffer, then the
moral choice would seem to be the latter, at least as long as
they are left no worse off than if the wrongs had not occurred.
While such reasoning helps justify such measures as
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affirmative action and reparations, 5 it cannot justify allowing
innocent people to be murdered due to the absence of capital
punishment. This dilemma yields the strongest case for
capital punishment on consequentialist grounds. The
argument is that practicing capital punishment along with
vigorous societal reform will in the long run produce the least
net loss of innocent life as a result of murder, even if it delays
somewhat the achievement of a just society.
Rawls speaks to this point in discussing slavery. For
Rawls, since slavery violates the fundamental right to liberty,
it can never be justified for the utilitarian reason that "the
greater gains to some outweigh the losses to others."8 6
However, he envisions the possibility that slavery might be
justified in order to "relieve even worse injustices," and when
it constitutes "an advance on established institutions... [and]
in time... will presumably be abandoned altogether."" His
example is an agreement among warring city-states to
enslave rather than kill captives. Analogously one might
argue, conceding capital punishment to be unjust in an unjust
society, that it may nevertheless be practiced to prevent the
worse injustice of allowing preventable murders to continue
while society transitions to a more just state of affairs.
There are two problems with this reasoning, one
principled and the other pragmatic. From a principled
perspective, Rawls does not discuss whether his hypothetical
parties are involved in a just or unjust war. This is an
important distinction. Suppose one party has unjustly
attacked another that is justifiably defending itself. In that
context, the attacker's agreement to enslave rather than kill
85. See, e.g., Roy L. Brooks, Getting Reparations for Slavery Right-A
Response to Posner and Vermeule, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 251 (2004)
(advocating an atonement model of reparations centered on restorative justice
in which all have a civic duty to participate irrespective of personal guilt,
especially white Americans who benefit from the lingering effects of slavery);
Kim Forde-Mazrui, Taking Conservatives Seriously: A Moral Justification for
Affirmative Action and Reparations, 92 CAL. L. REV. 686, 694-727 (2004)
(advocating a corrective justice model of reparations based on the collective
responsibility of past and present generations to correct the present harms of
historical racism); Dennis Klimchuck, Unjust Enrichment and Reparations for
Slavery, 84 B.U. L. REV. 1257 (2004) (advocating an unjust enrichment model of
reparations and noting its applicability to those who subsequently benefit from
prior wrongs).
86. RAWLS, supra note 15, at 248.
87. Id.
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captives is unjust, since its obligation is to stop the unjust
attack, in which case no one will be killed or enslaved. But
when the attacker is unwilling to desist and likely to prevail,
the agreement is just on the part of the defending party
because it is the lesser of two unavoidable evils. The capital
punishment analogy breaks down where society's injustices
are contributing to murder because, unlike the defending
party in the above example, there is no need to choose
between unavoidable evils when society, like the attacking
party, has the capacity (if not the willpower) to engage in
obligatory reform.
From a pragmatic perspective, the transitional argument
for capital punishment is too speculative and could be used to
justify capital punishment while undertaking less than
vigorous societal reform. That this society is grossly unjust
and that its injustices are largely responsible for the murder
rate is, in my opinion, undeniable. What is not known and
cannot be until attempted is how fast societal reform is
possible and what impact it would have on murder rates.
Perhaps seeing the process of reform would deter people from
committing murder as well as or more effectively than capital
punishment. Since the answers to these questions are so
uncertain, it is morally appropriate to oppose capital
punishment until vigorous societal reform is undertaken.
Only then should the viability of capital punishment be
considered.
Viewing society from a communal perspective, there are
times, as Sunstein and Vermeule note,8 when society has no
option but to make life-life choices among innocent parties.
Such choices are pervasive in social life, and at some level
impact almost everything society does. Fighting a war in
order to save innocent lives, for example, will inevitably cost
innocent lives. Similarly, activities undertaken to produce
life-sustaining goods, such as the testing of newly developed
drugs, will inevitably have side effects that cost lives.
How does all this relate to capital punishment?
Foremost, society cannot justly make life-life decisions unless
its decision-making process is just. In particular, when a
decision-making process is controlled by those who stand to
benefit from the decisions, the process is unjust to those who
88. Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 5, at 707-08, 727, 749-50.
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stand to suffer for the common good. For example, drafting
the working class to fight wars or locating polluting
industries in working class areas, while excusing society's
elite from those risks, would be unjust if the political process
that produced those decisions were controlled by that very
elite.
As for capital punishment, while both the victims and
perpetrators of murder in this society disproportionately come
from its disadvantaged classes, 9 it is certainly arguable that
the political process is tilted in favor of monied interests.90
Consequently, in response to public demands to address the
high murder rate in disadvantaged communities, the monied
elite might well prefer capital punishment over equalizing
educational and employment opportunities through measures
that redistribute wealth.91  Indeed, in response to a
burgeoning social reform movement emanating from the civil
rights and anti-Vietnam War struggles, over the past
generation society's elites have promoted fear of crime and
punitive approaches to crime as a primary means of
undermining reform movements and preserving their
privileged status.92
89. See supra note 63. See also Andrew Carsen, Poverty, Crime, and
Criminal Justice, in FROM SOCIAL JUSTICE TO CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note
53, at 25 (discussing studies of New York City that find a strong correlation
between murder rates and areas with high concentrations of poverty,
unemployment, lack of college education, and single parent families); JAMES F.
SHORT, JR., POVERTY, ETHNICITY, AND VIOLENT CRIME (1997) (documenting the
overconcentration of violent crime in high poverty areas and analyzing the
adverse environmental conditions associated with those areas that contribute to
crime).
90. See, e.g., JOSHUA COHEN & JOEL ROGERS, ON DEMOCRACY: TOWARD A
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN SOCIETY (1983); RULING AMERICA: A HISTORY
OF WEALTH AND POWER IN A DEMOCRACY (Steve Fraser & Gary Gerstle, eds.,
2005); KEVIN PHILLIPS, WEALTH AND DEMOCRACY: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE
AMERICAN RICH (2002).
91. See, e.g., PHILIP HARVEY, SECURING THE RIGHT TO EMPLOYMENT (1989)
(arguing for and detailing a feasible program for guaranteeing a right to
employment for all in the United States, and noting how guaranteed-job
proposals have historically been thwarted by business interests despite public
support for the idea in principle); NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, COMM. ON EDUC.
FIN., EQUITY AND ADEQUACY IN EDUCATION FINANCE: ISSUES AND
PERSPECTIVES (Helen F. Ladd et al., eds., 1999) (a series of articles on various
aspects of school finance litigation and reform).
92. See, e.g., KATHERINE BECKETr, MAKING CRIME PAY: LAW AND ORDER IN
CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN POLITICS (1997) (discussing how society's elites
manipulate fear of crime for political advantage, leading to excessively punitive
approaches to crime prevention in inner-city areas and roll-backs of social
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Capital punishment may save innocent lives. But so
might other less draconian means of addressing crime in the
form of societal reform measures that move this society in a
more just direction, equalize opportunity, and preserve life in
other respects as well. There is no way to know for sure
which approach or combination of approaches will most
effectively sustain life. Under those conditions, justice
requires a decision-making process in which all society's
members have proportionate input. Such a process does not
exist today.
IV. CONCLUSION
The answer to the question posed at the outset is that at
this point in time in this society capital punishment is
immoral even if it does deter murder. The great majority of
people executed for murder or on death row come from
disadvantaged backgrounds, and a greatly disproportionate
number are African Americans. If capital punishment is
increased in response to arguments such as those made by
Sunstein and Vermeule, many more will be executed. And if
for deterrence reasons the law is changed to allow the
execution of juveniles and the mentally impaired, many of
them will be executed too. This suggests that something is
amiss in society, and that through its failings society itself
has contributed to the problem.
The weakness of Sunstein and Vermeule's
consequentialist argument for capital punishment is that it
looks solely at results and not at causes. When thousands of
juveniles commit murder, society is partly to blame for failing
to raise its children properly. When adverse social conditions
and systemic racism produce murder, society is partly to
blame for failing to correct those injustices. Instead of
executing its most vulnerable members to solve a murder
problem it has helped create, society's obligation is to reform
itself and create conditions that do not give rise to murder. If
it fails to do so, society will bear responsibility for the deaths
welfare programs); Sarah Eschholz, The Media and Fear of Crime: A Survey of
the Research, 9 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POLY 37, 39 (1997) (discussing how
politicians and the media exploit and overly exaggerate crime, leading to an
overemphasis on crime prevention through punishment and producing "a
distorted image of what is important and how social policy should be
developed").
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of both the innocent people who are consequently murdered
and those it executes for murders that would not occur under
more just social conditions.
Sunstein and Vermeule are respected and influential
scholars. As such, their touting of capital punishment may
have a significant impact in lending support to efforts to
expand the use of capital punishment in this society. Their
consequentialist argument for capital punishment is
sophisticated and erudite. But it is overly abstract and fails
to take into account historical context and practical
consequences. As such, their approach brings to mind a line
from a Tom Lehrer song of yesteryear: "Once the rockets are
up, who cares where they come down? That's not my
department says Wernher von Braun."93
93. TOM LEHRER, Wernher von Braun, on THAT WAS THE YEAR THAT WAS
(Reprise Records 1990).
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